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This paper critically examines the inadequacy of Article 113 of the Constitution of
Kenya, 2010. Article 113 of the Constitution states that if the National Assembly and
Senate do not agree on a certain version of a bill then a mediation committee is
appointed by the speakers of both houses to attempt to develop a version of the Bill
that both houses will pass. Article 113(4) contemplates that in the event the mediation
committee fails to agree on a version of the bill within thirty days or if either house
rejects the version proposed by the committee, the Bill is defeated. In the advisory
opinion of the Supreme Court in Speaker of the Senate & another v Attorney-General
& 4 others fonner Chief Justice Dr Willy Mutunga noted that the process of dealing
with inter chamber deadlock that is prescribed is not suitable for important bills such
as the Division of Revenue Bill. This is because such a bill is set to divide money
between the national government and the counties. The failure of such a bill will
cause a systemic failure that would paralyse the health sector, the education sector,
the security machinery and almost all sectors that rely on funds from the national
government and the county governments.
The objective of this dissertation is to explore the specific solutions to the problem of
inter chamber deadlock as there indeed exists a problem . The paper examines a
number of countries such as Ireland, Australia, India and the United Kingdom in order
to see what we can borrow from them. In chapter three the paper explores the various
methods of dealing with inter-chamber deadlock . I analyse which method would work
for Kenya in Chapter four, I carried out a comparative study of the United Kingdom
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
1.1 Background
The senate of the 1st parliament was disbanded in 1966 I and after almost half a
centu ry it was formed in 20 13 in the n " parliam ent. The Lancaster Constitution
introduced the Senate and the House of Representatives. The senate of the time was
made up of representative from each district' . The role of the senate was to protect the
interests of the districts. The senate also had the power to legislate all other bills apart
from money bills could originate from the senate. According to Article 61(1) of the
Lancaster Constitution when a money bill has been sent to the senate and has not been
passed after one month of receiving the bill the House of Representatives shall present
the bill to the Governor-General for assent. The House of Representatives of the time
possessed veto with regard to money bills .3 There are many reasons given for the
disbandment of the senate but the most noteworthy was given by Proctor J in 1964
when he undermined the senate legislative contribution as being of ' sight value ', its
control over the executive to be ' insignificant', its influence on public opinion to be
' neg ligible', and its protection of the constitution to be ' irresolute' ." The Constitution
of Kenya 2010 then reintroduces the senate after almost 40 years . Chapter eight of the
Constitution of Kenya 2010 establishes Parliament, which is comprised of the
national assembly and the senate'. Articles 95(4) and (5) of the Constitution spell out
the different functions of the National Assembly. Whereas Article 96 of the
constitution then goes ahead to illuminate the different roles of the Senate.6
Article 113 of the Constitution 2010 provides that if the two hous es do not agree on a
certain version of a bill then a mediation committee is appointed by the speakers of
both houses to attempt to develop a version of the Bill that both houses will pass .
7Article 113(4) contemplates that in the event the mediation committee fails to agree
on a version of the bill within thirty days or if either house rejects the version
I Okoth-Ogendo H, 'The Politics of Constitutional change in Kenya since
Indep endence ,Ajl-ican Affairs. 1963, 9-34.
2 Article 36(1), Constitution of Kenya, 1963.
3 Article 61(1), Constitution of Kenya , 1963.
4 Proctor J, 'The Role of the Senate in the Kenyan Political System' , 1964,1nstitllte for
Development Studies, 389-415.
5 Article 93(1), Constitution 0.( Kenya (2010)
6 Article 96, Constitution 0.(Kenya (2010)
7 Article 113(4), Constitution 0.(Kenya (20 10)
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proposed by the committee, the Bill is defeated. This then raises the question,what if
the bill in question is of such great importance that the Bill has to be passed? It is to
be observed that the process of dealing with inter-chamber deadlocks as applies to
other Bills under Article 113 is not suitable for bills such as the Division of Revenue
Bill as the mediation process under Article 113 presupposes a Bill that reaches
deadlocks between the two houses, can fail, with the possibility of reintroduction after
six months. For instance, this cannot be done with regard to the Division of Revenue
Bill ,s as it is not a Bill that can be dropped without causing a constitutional financial
crisis that would paralyze the workings of the entire Government and even cause its
collapse."
1.2 Statement of problem
There indeed exists a problem in Article 113 of the constitution, in the event that the
two houses of parliament do not agree on a version of the bill that both houses can
pass, the bill may fail. What this means is that however important the bill may be then
it has no future in parliament. The problem is that this creates a deadlock that could
eventually cause a crisis in our country if the bill relates to important matters such as
security, health and division of revenue. 10
1.3 Justification of the study
This study is important, as it will look into the deadlock problem caused by Article
113 of the constitution. The paper will then give a solution to the problem caused by
the same.
1.4 Statement of Objective
To investigate how Kenya can deal with inter-chamber deadlock caused by the
inadequacy of Article 113 of the constitution.
1.5 Research Questions
The study seeks to find answers to the following research questions:
: Article 218, Constitution ofKenya (2010)
Speaker ofthe Senate & another v Attorney-General & 4 others [2013] eKLR
io Speaker ofthe Senate & another v Attorney-General & 4 others [2013] eKLR
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a) How can Kenya deal with inter-chamber deadlock?
b) What can be done to COITect the inad equacy of Article 113?
1.6 Hypothesis
Article 113 is inadequate in the way it deals with the disagreements between the two
houses of parliament. According to Article 113 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 if
the mediation committee does not come up with a version of the bill that both houses
can agree on then the bill may fail with possible reintroduction after six months.
Deadlock in parliament could cause a systemic failure that would paralyze the affairs
of the state. A functional parliament is important as the citizens exercise their
sovereignty through their elected members of parliament.
1.7 Assumption
Our bicameral parliament is less that three years old and the assumption made is that,
the two houses of parliament will not be able to solve their internal conflicts using the
mechanism given by Article 113 of the constitution. I I
1.8 Research Design & Methodology
I will examine the inadequacy of Article 113 of the constitution and look into how
best to resolve inter chamber deadlocks. I will do this by conducting a comparative
study with countries that have bicameral parliaments such as the United Kingdom.
Primary sources and secondary sources such as books and authoritative scholarly
articles will heavily be used in the research.
1.9 Limitations
The limitation that I encountered is that our constitution is still very young and there
is lack ofjurisprudence from within the country to support my findings and research.
1.10 Chapter Breakdown
Chapter one seeks to introduce the reader to the study. The literature review,
theoretical framework and the objectives and questions form the main parts of this
section. Chapter two critically discusses the theories that I rely on in my paper. I
discuss theories by Thomas Aquinas, Mahmood Mamdani and Montesquieu. Chapter
three then explores the different ways of dealing with inter-chamber deadlock in the
world. This chapter also examines how to correct the inadequacy of Article 113 of the
Constitution of Kenya, 2010. Chapter four borrows the best practices of dealing with
11 Article 113(4), Constitution of Kenya (2010 )
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inter-chamber deadlock from the United Kingdom and India . Finally, chapter four
concludes the entire study and gives recommendations to the problem caused by
Article 113 of the consti tution.
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Given the nature of politics, political contests and supremacy battles it is important
that the law is effective in managing deadlocks and the mediation process between the
two houses of parliament. Lack or the inadequacy of the law will mean that politics
takes its way, which may be harmful to the ordinary citizen. Law seeks to protect the
interests of the people and it is important that law intervenes in political processes
such as mediation between the two houses in order to have sanity in parliament. 12
This paper relies on Thomas Aquinas theory that human legislation is important in the
regulation of human conduct. Thomas Aquinas recognizes that because of the nature
of political regimes and the failing of natural law, it is important that human
legislation is enacted to regulate human conduct.
Thomas Aquinas asserts that natural law leaves some missing details that can only be
filled by positive laws . He argues that human law is necessary to enforce the moral
and political requirements of the natural law. Not all human beings use their practical
reason to its fullest capacity and some act maliciously even when they happen to
know better. Kenyan parliamentarians are a classic example of malicious human
beings. Natural law does not enforce itself and thus human laws must be used to
enforce organization and civilization in sociery"
Thomas Aquinas notes in the Summa Theologiae that there are two reasons for
changes in human laws, first human laws need to be changed because of reason.
Secondly, because of human conduct. He asserts that the law should be rightly
changed because of the changed condition of man . Thomas Aquinas argues that it is
imperative to change law because of the changing personality of man. He notes that in
the establishment of new laws or changes to the law there should be clear evidence of
the benefit that the change brings. 14
The problem of politics of underdeveloped countries as articulated by Mahmood
Mamdani is the traditional set up of the regulation and the politics of these countries.
This necessitated the concept of dualism whereby traditional politics is merged with
/ 2 Aketch M, Privatization and Democracy in East Africa: The promise ofAdministrative law.
Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers Ltd. 2009,35.
13 http://www.newadvent.org /su111111a/2097.htl11 on 7 January 2016.
14 http://www.newadvent.oI"!!/sul11111a/2097 .htl11 on 7 January 2016.
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modem politics from developed nations' <. Ordinarily the modem is progressive and
ultimately offers the best solution to political problems that are created by legal
loopholes such as deadlock, which is created by Article 113 of the constitution. ' 6
Article 113 creates a deadlock problem in the event that both houses of parliament do
not pass a bill . This problem has been encountered by more advanced states and have
solved this problem in various ways which will be discussed later. The concept of
dualism as proposed by Mahmood Mamdani basically states that an incorporation of
what is modem to the basic traditional model will solve some of our problems such as
the deadlock created by Article 11317.
The deadlock problem caused by Article 113 may sometimes lead to the fusion of
power where the executive can use its powers to influence the decisions of the two
houses of parliament. There are two ways of looking at this, first the executive may
use this loophole to ensure that certain bills do not see the light of day, secondly the
executive may use its power to push parliament to pass some bills that are quite
critical. In order to prevent an instance where the executive may use this loophole to
maliciously influence the decisions of parliament, it is important to deal with inter-
chamber deadlock. Montesquieu (1748) who is the father of 'separation of powers'
proposes that the three arms of government should be divided not only in person but
also in order. This safeguards the people against oppression. Montesquieu in 1748
gave a clear statement on separation of powers. He said 'when the legislative and
executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates,
there can be no liberty... there is no liberty if the powers of judging are not separated
from the legislative and executive. . . there would be an end to everything, if the same
man or the same body ... were to exercise those three powers' . 18
One of the principles of the devolved government is to enhance checks and balances
and the separation of powers. 19 An authoritarian interpretation of the separation of
powers means that none of the three arms of government should interfere with the
other unless it's to check and balance the other.
15 Mahmood M, Politics and Class/ormation, Monthly Review Press,1976, 1
16 Article 113, Constitution a/Kenya (2010)
17 Mahmood M, Politics and Class/ormation, 2.
18 Montesquieu B, 'The Spirit a/Laws ', 1748, Transalated and edited by Anne Cohler, Basia
Miller , Harold Stone. Nell' York: Cambridge University Press, 1989,36
19 Article 174, Constitution 0/Kenya (2010)
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Our constitution clearly aims at the sepa ration of the executive and the legislature. In
our former const itution the exec utive and the legislature were entwined as first
ministers were appointed from the members of parliament, meaning that ministers
who are essentially members of the executive also participated in the legislative
process". Our new constitution clearly separates Cabinet Secretaries from Memb ers
of Parliament. The. constitution 2010 prescribes that Cabinet Secretaries will be
teclmocrats and not politicians. The cabinet Secretaries are nominated by the
president and approved by parliament. 21 The constitution in many ways seeks to
separate the Executive from the Legislative branch of parliament; the spirit of our
constitution 2010 should be embodied in all the Articles of the constitution. Article
113 of the constitution of Kenya , 2010 is subject to a lot of interference from the
Executive either positively if the Executive is seeking to resolve statement of a Bill or
negatively if the Executive seeks to stop the passing of a Bill as explained abo ve and
thus should be reformed.
ro Article 16(1) Constitution of Kenya . (1963) .
21 Arti cle I52,Collstitution o(Kenva (2010).
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CHAPTER THREE: VARIOUS WAYS OF DEALING WITH INTER-
CHAMBER DEADLOCK AND HOW TO CORRECT THE INADEQUACY OF
ARTICLE 113 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, 2010.
3.1.1ntroduct ion.
The main issue in this pap er is the fact that if the two houses of parl iament do not
agree on a version of a bill that they can pass then the bill may possibly fail. The
reintroduction of the bill to the houses can take up to 6 months, the question is what if
the bill is so important that as a country we cannot do without. It may be a bill on
health, security or the division of revenue bill that allocates money between the
county government and the national govemmenr'. In this section the paper will delve
into how as a country we can deal with inter-chamber deadlock and ultimately how
we can correct this inadequacy that is present in our constitution.
3.2 How can Kenya deal with inter-chamber deadlock?
There are for sure many ways of dealing with inter-chamber deadlock in bicameral
parliaments. In this section I will analyze ways of dealing with inter-chamber
deadlock. Chapter 4 of the paper will then suggest a country that we can learn from
when it comes to this matter of inter-chamber deadlock.
3.2.1 Suspensive Veto
This method of dispute resolution between the two houses is wid ely practiced in the
UK and is specified in the Parliament's Acts 1911 and 1949 . The Parliament Act 1911
stripped the absolute veto power from the House of Lords. The House of Lords could
only delay a bill for 2 years, this led to the passing of the Parliament Act of 1949
which reduced the delay period from two years to one year23. If a bill that originates
from the House of Commons is passed in two consecutive sessions in the lower house
without the consent of the House of Lords then it may receive Royal Assent if the
interval between the first time it was passed and the second time it was passed is at
least a year. However there are exceptions to this , a money bill that has been certified
by the speaker is only subject to one months delay."
22 Speaker ofthe Senate & another v Attorney-General & 4 others [2013] eKLR
23 http://e-Iawresources.co.uk/Slatutes.php on 7 January 2016.
24 Meg R, 'Resolving Disputes between the Chambers '.University College London, at J.
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In this meth od, most times the lower house has the final say but the upper house may
delay the process in order to convince the lower house to accept some of the
amendments of the upper house. There are a number of important factors to consider
in this dispute resolution method. First , the period of delay is imperative. This is
because some bills cannot be subjected to a long period of delay. Such bills include
the division of revenue bill and other money bills.
In Poland, after the Sejm (the Poland lower house) considers and passes a bill then it
is forwarded to the senate for consideration; the Marshal (speaker) of the Senate refers
the bill to the relevant senate committee in charge with that matter. The Senate
committee is given 18 days to examine the bill and come up with a draft position of
the Senate concerning the bill . The senate is given a 30-day time line to debate and
come up with a decision concerning a regular bill. In the case of a draft budget, the
senate is given 20 days to debate the bill. The senate is given 14 days to debate and
give amendments or pass an urgent bill. If the senate does not give its amendments or
if it does not reject a bill then the bill is considered to be passed. The bill is then
referred by the Marshal of the Sejm to the President of the Republic of Poland for
assenr'",
Secondly, the specified majority votes that are required from the lower house in order
to pass a Bill is also of great importance. In most cases of supensive veto the lower
house is given the power to pass a bill in the event that they disagree with the upper
house, the lower house may override the upper house and pass the bill as is. A certain
majority is required in most jurisdictions in order to override the decision of the upper
house. For instance in Japan the lower house may overrule the decision of the upper
house with a 2/3 majority of the lower house.".
This is an effective method, the only problem is that most times the lower house that
possesses the veto does not consider the recommendations and suggestions of the
senate because at the end of the day as it possesses the veto power. This beats the
logic of bicameralism, as the whole point of having two houses is to ensure that bills
are reviewed and to improve on the quality ofbiIIs passed.27
25 http://opis.sejm.gov.pl/en/procesustawodawczy.pJlp on 7 January 2016 .
26 Meg R, • Disputes between the Chambers '.University College London, at 3.
27 N0l10n,P , 'Adding Vallie? The role of the Second Chambers ', Asia Pacific La1\' Review,
2007,at7
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3.2.2 Joint session .
This is when the two houses of parliament hold a joint sitting to discuss a bill. This
enables the members of the two houses to engage directly to discuss the bill in
question. This creates a platform for the members to discuss the matter on a level
playing field and none of the houses feels superior to the other.
This is practiced in India. The parliament of India is made up of the President of
India, Council of States and the House of the People." The Council of States shall
consist of not more than two hundred and thirty eight representatives of the states and
union territories and twelve nominated members. The twelve nominated members
shall be nominated by the president and shall be made up of people with special
knowledge or practical experience in the fields of literature, science, art and social
science.29The House of the People on the other hand shall consist of not more than
five hundred and thirty members who are elected from the territorial constituencies,
which make up the states and members who represent the union territories shall not be
more than 20.30
According to Article 108(1) of the Indian constitution if a bill has been passed by one
house and transmitted to the other and the Bill is rejected by the other house or the
houses finally disagreed as to the amendments to be made in the bill or more than six
months elapse from the date of the reception of the Bill by the other Houses without
the bill being passed by it, the president may summon both houses by public
notification to hold a joint sitting in order to deliberate on the bill. If at the joint sitting
the two houses with or without amendments agree in the joint sitting to pass the bill
by a majority then it shall be deemed to have been passed by both houses" .
It is important to note that the Constitution of India provides that a joint sitting shall
not apply to a money bill. A money bill is first discussed in the House of the People
and thereafter it is transmitted to the Council of States for its recommendations and
the Council of states shall within a period of fourteen days from the date of its receipt
of the Bill retum the Bill to the House of the People with its recommendations and the
House of the People may accept or reject all of the recommendations.r' If the House
of the People accepts any of the recommendations of the Council of States, the Money
28 Article 79, Constitution ofIndia.
29 Article 80, Constitution ofIndia .
30 Article 81, Constitution ofIndia .
3 J Article 108(4),Constitution ofIndia .
32 Article 109(2),Constitution ofIndia
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bill shall be deemed to have been passed'r'. If the House of the People does not accept
any of the recommendations of the Council of States, the Money Bill shall be deemed
to have been passed by both houses in the form , which was passed by the House of
'4the People:'
The joint session that is called by the pres ident presents an ideal situation for the two
houses to discuss a bill in a less confrontational scenario. This presents a good
solution to deal with supremacy battles between the two houses of parliament. Very
recently the Senate and National Assembly of Kenya could not agree and this
necessitated the senate seeking an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court. The
issue was that the Speaker of the National Assembly transmitted a bill to the president
for assent before it was debated in the senate." This is an instance of a supremacy
battle in our own parliament. A joint session presents an ideal opportunity for the two
houses to agree and most importantly pass crucial bills as it prevents fierce political
battles.
3.2.3 Joint committee with lower house Veto
Kenya at the moment uses a joint committee to resolve disputes between the two
houses. According to Article 112(1) if anyone of the houses passes a bill concerning
counties and the second house rejects the Bill then the Bill shall be referred to a
mediation committee appointed under Article 113. The speakers of the two houses of
parliament are in charge of appointing the members of the mediation committee. The
committee consists of equal number of members from both houses. The role of the
mediation committee is to attempt to develop a version of the bill that both houses can
pass 36. A good example of such a scenmio is when the speakers of the two houses of
parliament on zs" April appointed a mediation committee compnsmg of the
following members Hon . Mutava Musyimi,MP(chairperson), Hon. Sen. Mutahi
Kagwe, EGH ,MP, Hon. Mary Emaase, Mp, Hon Beatrice Elachi, CBS , MP, Hon .
Sen. Boni Khalwale, Mp. And Hon. Tom Joseph Kajwang, Mp.
The joint committee met five times to deliberate on the Division of Revenue Bill,
2015. The issue was the senate proposed to lower allocation of money to the National
government by Ksh 1,766,500,00 from Ksh 978,692,000,000 to Ksh 976,925,500,000.
33 Article 109(3), Constitution ofIndia
34 Article 109(4), Constitution ofIndia
35 Speaker of the Senate & another V Attorney-General & 4 others [2013] eKLR
36 Article 113(1),Constitution ofKenya 2010 .
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The senate wanted to increase the amount of money going to counties to
259,771 ,500,000. After consultative discussions the committee unanimously observed
that the funds given to counties should therefore be increased progressively with time
and the additional funds should be reallocations. Y
A joint committee with ve to is quite different from the situation described abo ve
where a bill may fail if the mediation committee does not come up with a version of
the bill that can be passed by both houses. For instance in France the committee is
charged with devising a compromise and ultimately a solution. After the committees
decision both houses vote on the matter. If the two houses are not able to decide on
the matter then the lower house has the last word. The joint committee system with
veto is just like the suspensive veto that has been discusses earlier. The only
difference is that in the joint committee with veto , a bill has to be subjected to the
joint committee in the event of disagreement.
In this method of resolving deadlock, the joint committee is seen as a rubber stamp
and most times the lower house negotiates knowing that in the event of disagreement
the bill has to pass. In most instances the upper house is considered just a conveyer
belt in this method of resolving deadlock. In France the committee at most times
disagreed and the lower house had the last word.38 The advantage of this method is
that an important bill has no possibility of failing, as the decision of the lower houses
will stand in the event of deadlock.
Most committees fail because of party politics and ' tyranny of numbers' . In most
decisions the government and the opposition hold very different views and the same
applies even when a joint committee is formed, The system of voting that applies in
parliament is the same system that applies in a joint committee and because of this
most discussions end up in deadlock.
This method does not yield success as the upper house lacks the initiative to
deliberate on matters as most times the veto power of the lower house applies. The
members of the lower house are not encouraged to compromise because at the end of
the day they possess veto power."
37 The division of revenue bill, 2015, Mediation Committee Report in Accordance to Article
II3 ofthe constitution.I
38 Meg R, Resolving Disput es between the Chamb ers.University College London, 6
39 Meg R, Resolving Disputes between the Chambers.University College London, 7
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3.2.4 Double dissolution of the two houses.
This is quite a rare method of resolving disputes between the two houses of
parliament. This is quite prevalent in Australia, section 57 of the Australian
constitution provides that if the senate with an interval of at least three months rejects
a proposed law or does not pass it with certain amendments that the House of
Representatives will agree on then the Govemor General may dissolve both houses
simultaneously. It goes ahead to provide that if after such dissolution the House of
Representatives passes the proposed law with or without any amendments which have
been suggested by the senate and the senate fails to pass the bill again then the
Govemor-General may convene a joint sitting of the members of the senate and the
members of the House of Representatives.Y
The first ever double dissolution in Australia happened in the year 19I4, Joseph
Cook's govemment came into power in 19I3 but after the election of a speaker of the
House of Representatives lacked a majority. The situation was even worse in the
senate where it held 7 out of a possible 36 seats . This situation created a back and
forth between the two houses of parliament and many reverses. The Governor-
General of the time, Sir Ronald Munro-Ferguson dissolved the two houses of
parliament before the Great War broke out later that year. This necessitated a general
election where the Joseph Cook govemment was defeated by the labor party."
The third double dissolution was among the most historic as two opposition senators
moved to the high court to object the double dissolution. In 1973 the senate rejected
six bills after debate in the House of Representatives, the senate rejected these bills in
two instances. The senate refused to pass the Govemments revenue appropriation
Bills but then after a lot of convincing and of course politics the senate passed the
Appropriation bills in order to avoid a financial crisis, the Govemor General shortly
dissolved the two houses after the disagreement over the two bills.42
The two senators moved to court objecting the double dissolution 111 the case of
Cormack v Cope 43. The senators argued that a double dissolution could only be
granted with regard to one bill and not a cluster of bills, as was the case in the third
40 Article 57,Constitution ofAustralia.
4Ihttp://www.aph.gov .au!About Parliament/Parliamentmy Departments/Parliamentary Libra
rv/pubs/l])h]?OOO 1/0 1RP09 on 7 January 2016.
42 Final Report ofthe Constitutional Commission , AGPS, 1988, Vol. 1,224.
43 Cormack v Cope (1974) 131 CLR 432
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double dissolution. The court held that a double dissolution could apply to a cluster of
bills as long as the bills met the requisite requirements"
There have been six double dissolutions in Australia, this shows that its a
cumbersome procedure that has proved quite in effective in solving inter chamber
deadlock. The senate select committee of 1950 noted that the double dissolution
mechanism was not effective and recommended that if the senate did not pass an
ordinary bill within six months and a money bill within two months then a joint sitting
between the two houses should follow in order to resolve the deadlock.Y
3.3 What can be done t o correct the inadequacy of Article 113?
The first part of this chapter explores what we can do in order to solve inter-chamber
deadlocks. The second part of this chapter I want to discuss what can be done in order
to accommodate amendments to Article 113 of the Constitution of Kenya, 201046.
Indeed a problem exists, if this inadequacy is to be corrected it can only be done by
amending that specific part of the Constitution.
The Constitution of Kenya 2010 is still at its infancy as it is only six years old.
However, this does not mean that it lacks discrepancies even this early. Inter-chamber
deadlock occurs because of the show of political supremacy and tyranny of numbers
either from government or opposition'" . The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 introduced
very many changes and truly it was a new beginning for Kenyans. The Constitution of
Kenya 2010 introduced the concept of devolved government and one of the main
objectives of devolution is to give powers of self-governance to the people and
enhance the participation of the people in the exercise of the powers of the state and
in making decisions affecting them48. This also led to the establishment of county
governments 49, which consists primarily of a county assembly and a county
executive5o. A county assembly shall consist of members elected by the people from
- I
each ward and shall be elected for a term of five years ." The County Executive
44Sawer G, 'Singulars, Plurals and Section 57 ofthe constitution' (1976) 8 Federal review,45.
45http://www.aph.gov.au!About Parliament/Parliamentary Departments/Parliamentary Libra
ry/pubs/rn/rnOOO 1/0 IRP09 on 7 January 2016.
46 Article 113, Constitution ofKenya 2010.
47http://ll'lI'lI'.aph.gov.au/About ParliamentlParliamentan! DepartmentslParliamentan! Libr
arvipubslrpirp0001101RP09 on 7 January 2016.
48 Article 174(c),Constitution ofKenya 2010
49 Article 175,Constitution 0.(Kenya 2010
50 Article 176.Constitution 0.(Kenya 2010
5 1 Article 177(4) ,Constitution ofKenya 2010
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Committee on the other hand consists of the county Governor, Deputy Governor and
members who are appointed by the County Governor with the approval of the county
assembly.Y In order to protect devolution, which is a very new concept in Kenya the
constitution of Kenya , 20 I0 established the Senate to protect the interest of counties
and their govenunents.r' The Senate does this through a number of functi ons, first the
Senate makes laws by considering and approving Bills that concern counties 54 .
Secondly, the Senate also determines the allocation of national revenue among all the
47 counties." .
Under the new constitutional dispensation, one house, which is the senate, will have
the chance to review laws that have been passed by the National Assembly. This
ultimately increases the quality and sanity of legislation that is passed as one-house
reviews and may make changes to a law that is passed. All legislations of the Senate
are subject to review of the National Assembly under Article 111 and Article 112 of
the Constitution.
The role that both houses play is vital and imperative as seen above and thus it is
important that the system of resolving deadlock is clear and robust to allow for an
effective legislative process. The amendment of this constitution can be done in two
ways". First the amendment can be through a parliamentary initiative whereby the
bill may be introduced in either the National Assembly or the Senate." Parliament
should publicize any bill to amend the constitution in order to ensure that there is
public discussion on the bill. In order for a bill to amend the constitution to pass then
both houses of parliament should pass the bill in its second and third reading with a
two third majority.i''
After the bill has been passed by both the Senate and the National Assembly the bill is
forwarded to the president for assent and publication 59 and also for certification
showing that the bill has been passed by parliament in accordance with Article 256 of
the constitution.P" The President shall then assent and the bill wi1l61 be published
52 Article 179,Constitution ojKenya 2010
53 Article 96,Constitution ojKenya 201a
54 Article 96(2).Constitution ojKenya 2010
55 Article 96(3), Constitution 0/Kenya 2010
56 Article 255.Constitl/tion ofKenya 2010
57 Article 256(l)(a).Constitl/tion ofKenya 2010
58 Article 256(l)(d).Constitl/tion ofKenya 2010
59 Article 256(3) .Constitl/tion ofKenya 2010
60 Article 256(3)(b), Constitution 0/Kenya 201a
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within thirty days after the bill IS enacted by Parliament. There are certain
amendments that will have to be approved by a referendum. They include: the
supremacy of the constitution, the tenitory of Kenya, the sovereignty of the people,
the national values and principles of governance, the bill of lights, the term of the
office of the president, the independence of the judiciary and the commissions and
independent offices which chapter fifteen of the constitution applies, the functions of
parliament, the provisions of chapter sixteen on amendments to the constitution and
the objects, principles and structure of the devolved government.f If an amendment
concerns any of the above issues then the President is compelled by law to request the
Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) to conduct a national
referendum within 90 days in order to approve the bill. The President must do this
before assenting to the bill in question.Y The chairperson of the IEBC has to certify to
the President within thirty days that the bill has been approved in order for the
president to assent to the bi1l64 .
Secondly the amendment can be through a popular initiative which has been signed
by at least one million registered voters'" this may occur in two ways, either through a
general suggestion or a draft bill on the matter. If the bill is in the form of a general
suggestion then the promoters of the popular initiative shall formulate it into a draft
bilI.66 The promoters of the popular initiative shall deliver the draft bill to the IEBC,
which shall carry out verification to ascertain that the initiative is indeed supported by
a million voters.
If the IEBC is convinced that the voters are registered and that the initiative is in line
with Article 257 of the constitution the IEBC shall submit the draft bill to all the 47
county assembly's for consideration within three months.l" The county assembly may
approve or reject the bill, if the county assembly approves the bill the speaker of the
county assembly shall deliver a copy of the bill jointly to the two houses of
parliament, with a certificate showing that the county assembly has approved it.68
6 1 Article 256(4), Constitution ofKenya 2010
62 Article 255(1) ,Constitution 0/Kenya 2010
63 Article 256(5)(a),Constitlltioll ofKenya 2010
64 Article 256(5)(b),Collstitutioll ofKenya 2010
65 Article 257,Constitution ofKenya 2010
66 Article 257(4), Constitution 0/Kenya 201a
67 Article 257(5), Constitution 0/Kenya 2010
68 Article 257(6),Constitlltion ofKenya 2010
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CHAPTER FOUR: COMPARATIVE STUDY
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter I will use the findings in chapter 3 to recommend the best solution for
Kenya. I have analysed a wide array of solutions from joint sessions to double
dissolution of both houses in the event of interchamber deadlock. All these solutions
have advantages and disadvantages but some are better for our country. I wiII do this
by carrying out a comparative study of the United Kingdom and India.
4.2 Why the United Kingdom and India?
In chapter 3 I looked at a wide range of solutions into the deadlock problem caused by
Article 113. From all the solutions I analysed above the best solution for Kenya, as a
country is either the suspensive veto system or the joint session method that is
practised in India.
As a result of British colonisation there has been the implementation of English
common law into our legal system and this is why I have chosen UK as a country we
can learn from. After independence in 1963 Kenya institutionalised the common law
system. The legal system and the Kenyan courts were basically a replica of the
common law system. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and of the subordinate
courts was to be exercised . Most of the English ordinances were direct copies of the
English Acts. In order to effectively administer English law the colonial
administration established a Supreme Court and different subordinate courts . Lawyers
from the United Kingdom were the judges of these court at that time. Africans at that
time run their affairs by customary law. The British considered this customary system
to be inferior. In the celebrated case of R V Amkeyo73 Judge Hamilton said 'in my
opinion the use of the word 'marriage' to describe a relationship entered into by an
African initiative with a woman of his tribe according to tribal custom is a misnomer
which has led in the past to considerable confusion of ideas. I know of no word that
correctly describes it; 'wife-purchase' is not altogether satisfactory, but it comes
much nearer to the idea than that of 'marriage' as generally understood among
civilised peoples .'
73 R l' Amkeyo [1917] eKLR.
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This clearly shows that the judges at that time were very inclined to English law and
regarded customary law as mediocre. The colonial administration failed to adapt the
English law to suit the culture of the local inhabitants.74 As a country we can shy
awa y from the influence of the English common law on our own system of law. It is
for this reason that I decided to conduct a comparative study of how the Unit ed
Kingdom deals with inter-chamber deadlock in its bicameral parliament.
The second reason I chose UK is because its system of resolving inter-chamber
deadlock has many advantages and can be adopted in Kenya. The main advantage of
the suspensive veto system that is practised by the UK is that there is no possibility
that a bill may fail under this system. The inadequacy of Article 113 of the
Constitution of Kenya 2010 is that a bill may fail. The danger of a biII failing is that
reintroduction takes up to 6 months according to parliaments calendar. This may be
catastrophic if the bill in question is a money biII or an important bill. The suspensive
veto system practised by the United Kingdom will ensure that a bill cannot fail.
One of the reasons why I chose India is because of the historical background that
Kenya and India shares. India was colonized Britain just like our country Kenya. In
1608 the Bri tish East India Company (BEIC) established a trading route to India. The
country's port of Surat was the main trading port and the British East India Company
(BEIC) continued establishing trading posts along the western and Eastern coasts of
India. In 1757 after the battle of Plassey the company gained control of Bengal and
was given authority by the then Parliament to rule and administer the Indian territory.
In 1727 English common Law started being practised, this was after the establishment
of English courts in Bombay, Bengal and Madras. The courts were mainly established
to adjudicate disputes between English subjects in these three areas. When an English
citizen charged an Indian citizen then they would be bound with English common
law. There were only three English courts in the country at that time and this meant
that at times an Indian citizen would have to traverse long distances in order to appear
in court once a complaint was lodged against him/her.i"
The British East India Company (BEIC) ruled India until the Sepoy Rebellion in
1857. One of the factors that lead to this rebellion was the fact that the British
excluded Indians during legislation making. i" This led to the declaration of India as a
74 Nyali Ltd v Attorney-General [1955] eKLR.
75 Bannerjee A, English Law in India , Atlantic Highlands, Humanities Press Inc, 1984,22.
76 Bannerjee A, English Law in India , Atlantic Highlands.TS,
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crown colony in 1858 as the British government needed to establish effective control
in the region. The Governor-General (the vicero y) was the leading administrator and
the responsibility of Indian affairs was given to the Secretary of State for India. The
British East India Company (BEIC) lost its political control and commercially
declined significantly. In 1873 the British East India Company (BEIC) officially
ceased to exist.
The British political institutions were replicated in India as a way of administering
India as a colony. After India was declared a crown colony in 1858 there was a
replication of the procedure and legal codes of English common law into Indian law.77
In the 1900s the independence movement began to gain momentum. Lawyers who
had been trained in Britain such as Nehru and Gandhi were the main drivers of
independence. The National Congress led the independence movement and later
formed government after independence in 1947, this followed a ratification of the
Indian constitution in 1950, and the Indian constitution was heavily borrowed from
English common law.
Indian has amended its constitution many times since independence but all these time
it has done this within the bounds of English common law.78 India provides a good
country to borrow from as we share a common history and secondly it is a country
who 's laws are based on English common law just like Kenya.
It is also important to note that the joint session method that is practised by India
ensures that both houses discuss a bill in the same house and at the same time. This
ensures that the two houses of parliament debate the bill in a less confrontational
manner and also ensures that both two houses discuss the matter on an equal playing
field. The advantage of this method over the suspensive veto practised by the United
Kingdom is that in this method no house has veto over the other house creating a
situation where one houses is superior to the other. The joint session method
eliminates supremacy battles between both houses of parliament and thus both houses
are able to discuss a bill in an amicable manner",
77 Coupland, R, The Indian Problem: Report on the Constitutional Problem in India, Oxford
University Press, New York , 1944,42
78 Coupland, R, The Indian Problem: Report on the Constitutional Problem in India , 30.
79 Meg R, Resolving Disputes between the Chambers. University College London, at 7.
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4.3 United Kingdom.
The United Kingdom of Great Britain is a collection of England, Scotland, N0I1hem
Ireland and Wales. At first all the four countries shared the single Parliament at
Westminster. The four countries over the last couple of years have each established a
Parliament of their own. The first bicameral parl iament in the world was established
in England and then in the United States of America.
The United Kingdom parliament is made up of two houses namely the House of
Commons and the House of Lords. The House of Commons is elected by the people
and the party that has the highest representation in parliament forms govemment. The
house of commons has approximately 650 elected members. The House of Lords on
the other hand is made up of 825 members and basically they check the House of
Commons.so
In the United Kingdom the suspensive veto system applies to money bills and Public
bills. Section 1 of the Parliament Act 1911 provides that once a money bill is passed
by the House of Commons, the bill shall then be sent to the House of Lords and if the
bill is not passed without amendment within one month then the bill shall be
considered to have been passed, the bill shall then be presented to His Majesty for
Royal Assent. This is set to happen when the House of Lords have not consented to a
bill. The House of Commons has veto with regard to money bills because of the
importance of such bills . Section 1(2) of the Parliament Act 1911 defines money bills
as ' a Public Bill which in the opinion of the Speaker of the House of Commons
contains only provisions dealing with all or any of the following subjects, namely, the
imposition, repeal, remission, alteration, or regulation of taxation, the imposition for
the payment of debt or other financial purposes of charges on the Consolidated
Fund , the National Loans Fund or on money provided by Parliament, or the variation
or repeal of any such charges, supply, the appropriation, receipt, custody, issue or
audit of accounts of public money, the raising or guarantee of any loan or the
repayment thereof, or subordinate matters incidental to those subjects or any of them.
In this subsection the expressions "taxation," "public money," and "loan" respectively
do not include any taxation, money, or loan raised by local authorities or bodies for
local purposes. ,8 1
80 http ://www.parliament.uklbusiness/lords/work-of-the-house-of-Iords/ on 6 February 2017.
8 1 Section 1(2) Parliament Act 1911.
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Section 2( 1) of Parliament Act 1911 provides for public bills, it provides that if any
other bill is passed by the House of Commons in two successive sessions of either the
same parliament or different parliaments and is sent to the House of Lords before the
end of one month and is rejected by the House of Lords in the two instances then the
bill shall be deemed to have been passed and shall be presented Lo His majesLy [or
Royal Assent.82
In the United Kingdom the House of Commons is the superior of the two when
passing legislation and possesses suspensive veto in money bills and in public bills.
This prevents a situation where there is a constant shuttle between the two houses of
parliament until the two houses find a version of the bill, which they can both pass. In
this system there is no possibility of deadlock as the House of Commons has veto
power.
4.4 India
The parliament of India is made up of the President of India, Council of states and the
House of the People.Y The president of India is elected by the members of the
Electoral College, which is made up of the elected members of the Council of States
and the House of the People, members of the legislative assemblies of the states and
Union Territories. The president is elected for a five-year term and forms part of
Parliament.
The Council of States shall consist of not more than two hundred and thirty eight
representatives of the states and union territories and twelve nominated members. The
twelve nominated members shall be nominated by the president and shall be made up
of people with special knowledge or practical experience in the fields of literature,
science, art and social science.f"
The House of the People on the other hand shall consist of not more than five hundred
and thirty members who are elected from the tenitorial constituencies, which make up
the states and members who represent the union territories shall not be more than
20. 85
82 Section 2( 1)Par/ialllent Act 1911.
83 Article 79, Constitution ofIndia .
84 Article 80 , Constitution (ifIndia .
85 Article 81 , Constitution ojIndia .
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In India a money bill may either originate from the House of the People or the
Council of States86. The constitution of India provides for money bills and ordinary
Bills. If an ordinary Bill has been passed by one house and is sent to the other house
there are three things that could happen. First. The other house may reject the Bill.
Secondly, the two houses may not able to agree as to the amendments to be made to
the bill. Thirdly, the bill may not be discussed by the other house and more than six
months elapse from the date the Bill was sent to the other house.s7
At this point the president may use his power under Article 86 of the Constitution of
India to notify the two houses if they will hold a joint session or not. The president
may summon the Council of States and the House of the People to a joint sitting in
order to deliberate on a bill which the two houses could not agree on. When the
president gives his intention to summon both houses then the two houses are not
supposed to deliberate further on the bill in question. f
In the joint sitting, if the two houses agree on the Bill with amendments and the Bill is
passed with a majority of the total members who are present then the Bill shall be
deemed to have been passed."
Money bills in India are treated differently and are not introduced by the Council of
States" . If a money bill has been passed by the House of the People it is first
transmitted to the Council of States for recommendations. The Bill is returned to the
House of the People within 14 days with the reconunendations of the Council of
States. At this point the House of the people may either accept or reject all or any of
the recommendations of the Council of States." If the House of the People accepts the
recommendations of the council of States then it is deemed to have been passed if the
House of the People does not accept any of the recommendations then the bill is
deemed to have been passed.92 If the bill that has been passed by the House of the
People within the fourteen-day period then it shall be deemed to have been passed by
9"both houses after the end of the fourteen days. ~
86 Article 107, Constitution ofIndia.
87 Article 108(1) , Constitution ofIndia.
88 Article 108(3), Constitution ofIndia.
89 Article I 08(4) , Constitution ofIndia .
90 Article 109, Const itution ofIndia .
9 1 Article 109(2) . Consiuutton ofIndia.
91 Article 109(4) . Constitution ofIndia.
93 Article 109(5). Constitution ofIndia.
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The parliament of India resolves disputes in two ways. First, it uses the joint session
method where the president calls for a joint session of the House of the People and the
Council of States to deliberate on a bill. Secondly the House of the People posses veto
when it comes to money bills, the House of the People can pass a money bill either by
accepting or rejecting the recommendations of the Council of States.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
5.1 Conclusion
In this section the paper will provide a short conclusion of each of the chapters. I will
finally give my recommendations for the Kenyan situation.
Chapter one explored the problem that is presented by Article 113 of the constitution.
I looked at the possibility of deadlock that is presented by Article 113. Article 113 of
the constitution of Kenya, 2010 provides that in the case of disagreement the speakers
of the Senate and the National Assembly shall appoint a mediation committee
comprising of an equal number of members from the Senate and National Assembly.
This committee is tasked with the function of coming up with a version of the bill that
both houses can pass. If the version of the bill that the mediation committee comes up
with is not passed by either house then the bill is deemed to have failed and
reintroduction of the same bill is after 6 months. This indeed presents a problem, as
certain bills such as money bills should be passed within a certain timeline.
Chapter two discussed the theories, which support my idea. I first looked at
Mahmood Mamdani who critically examines the problem of the politics of
underdeveloped countries. I also discussed the theory of regulation of human conduct
through positive laws by Thomas Aquinas, this is important as the conduct of African
politicians is wanting and thus their conduct needs to be regulated through human
legislation.
Chapter three examined almost all the methods of dispute resolution that are used by
bicameral parliaments . I looked at methods such as double dissolution of both houses,
which is practised in Australia to joint sessions between the two houses, which is
practised in India. I also examined what can be done to correct the inadequacy of
Article 113 through an amendment to the constitution.
Chapter 4 used the findings in Chapter 3 to narrow down to two methods , which we
can borrow from. I settled on the suspensive veto system, which is practised in the
United Kingdom and the joint session, which is practised by India. I also gave reasons
why I choose these two countries for the comparative study and the advantages of the
two above mentioned methods.
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5.2 Recommendations
Our system of dispute resolution m Parliament at the mom ent is based on a j oint
mediation committee between the two houses of par liament '". I would sugges t a two
phased dispute resolution mechanism. First, money bill s such as the division of
revenue bill should be passed by both houses but the National Assembl y should
possess veto power when it comes to such bills . In the event that the Senate accepts or
rejects a bill, then the National Assembly should be able to pass the bill with or
without the recommendations of the senate as the back and forth between the two
houses is not a suitable method of dealing with money bills such as the Division of
Revenue Bill. The same should also appl y if the Senate refuses to debate a bill within
a stipulated time95.
Secondly there are many other more important bills on issues such as health, security
and education. If the two houses fail to agree on a version to be passed of such bills
under Article 113 of the constitution" then the president should call a joint session in
order for the Senate and the National Assembly to sit in either of the houses and
discuss the bill. If the bill is passed with a simple majori ty then it is then forwarded
for presidential assent. Th is will efficiently reduce political battles between the two
houses and the two houses will be able to discuss the bill on pure ideologies that will
develop our country. The law cannot force parliamentarians to have poli tical goodwill
it is thus imp erative that the parli amentarians that we elect posses the initiative and
the good will to make the system work.
I will conclude with the words of form er Chief Justice Dr Willy Mutunga m the
Speaker of the Senate & another v Attorney-General case where the Supreme Court
bench was giving an advisory opinion to the national assembly and senate on
mediation matters "mediation is not something one can command - it is all about
managing relationships between disputing parties. The law itself therefore, will have
Vel)! little to do with a success/it! mediation outcome. Thus, any hiccups that may
occur in the mediation process, including the one defin ed under Article 110(3), will
have to be ironed out through the development of a culture of consultation, the
progression of mutual respect between the hila chambers and the practice of
94 Article 112(b),Constitution ofKenya 2010
9S Meg R, Resolving Disputes between the Chambers.University College London, 6
96 Article 113,Constitution ofKenya 20 10
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collegiality between the Speakers oj each House. This Court, J humbly submit, may
not go f urther than to suggest this, as to delve into further details would border
dangerously on giving direction to a different arm of Governm ent on its internal
processes. This wouldfly in the/ace ofthe doctrine ofseparation o.f powers.97"
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